48 research outputs found
Grace and Free Will: Quiescence and Control
Stump and Timpe have recently proposed Thomistic based solutions to the traditional problem in Christian theology of how to relate grace and free will. By taking a closer look at the notion of control, I subject Timpeās account ā itself an extension of Stumpās account ā to extended critique. I argue that the centrepiece of Timpeās solution, his reliance on Doweās notion of quasi-causation, is misguided and irrelevant to the problem. As a result, Timpeās account fails to avoid Semi-Pelagianism. I canvass two alternatives, each of which adheres to the broad theological assumptions made by Stump and Timpe, including the positing of only one āuniqueā grace. I conclude that each of these proposals fails, although I argue that one comes as close as it is possible to get to a solution given the assumptions made
Powers opposed and intrinsic finks
Philosophers disagree over whether dispositions can be intrinsically ļ¬nked or masked. Choi suggests that there are no clear, relevant differences between cases where intrinsic ļ¬nks would be absurd and those where they seem plausible, and as a result rejects them wholesale. Here, I highlight two features of dispositional properties which, when considered together, provide a plausible explanation for when dispositions can be subject to intrinsic ļ¬nks and when not
Robustness and up-to-us-ness
Frankfurt-style cases purport to show that an agent can be morally responsible for an action despite not having any alternatives. Some critics have responded by highlighting various alternatives that remain in the cases presented, while Frankfurtians have objected that such alternatives are typically not capable of grounding responsibility. In this essay I address the recent suggestion by Seth Shabo that only alternatives associated with the āup to usā locution ground moral responsibility. I distinguish a number of kinds of ability, suggest which kinds of abilities ground the truth of the āup to usā locution, and outline how these distinctions apply to the indeterministic buffer cases
Heavenly freedom, derivative freedom, and the value of free choices
Sennett (1999) and Pawl & Timpe (2009; 2013) attempt to show how we can praise heavenly agents for things they inevitably do in heaven by appealing to the notion of derivative freedom. Matheson (2017) has criticized this use of derivative freedom. In this essay I show why Matheson's argument is inconclusive but also how the basic point may be strengthened to undermine the use Sennett and Pawl & Timpe make of derivative freedom. I then show why Matheson is mistaken to claim that the value of free choice depends on an agent retaining the ability to change their mind; in so doing I demonstrate that some choices which result in fixed outcomes - a feature of the choices leading to impeccability - can indeed be valuable even if they cannot be undone
Possibilites for divine freedom
I examine three accounts of divine freedom. I argue that two recent accounts which attempt to explain Godās freedom without appealing to alternative possibilities fail. I then show how a view of divine freedom based on Robert Adamsās idea that Godās grace means he has no obligation to create the best world is able to explain how God can be free while also being perfectly good and perfectly rational
Abilities to do otherwise
In this paper I argue that there are different ways that an agent may be able to do otherwise and that therefore, when free will is understood as requiring that an agent be able to do otherwise, we face the following question: which way of being able to do otherwise is most relevant to free will? I answer this question by first discussing the nature of intrinsic dispositions and abilities, arguing that for each action type there is a spectrum of intrinsic abilities. I suggest that recognising this allows us to articulate two ways in which an intrinsic ability is general (such that there are two kinds of non-general ability). And I argue that the abilities most relevant to free will need to be non-general in both of the ways identified. Along the way I show why these points threaten to undermine Vihvelinās dispositionalist account of free will
Does Everyone Think the Ability to do Otherwise is Necessary for Free Will and Moral Responsibility?
Christopher Franklin argues that, despite appearances, everyone thinks that the ability to do otherwise is required for free will and moral responsibility. Moreover, he says that the way to decide which ability to do otherwise is required will involve settling the nature of moral responsibility. In this paper I highlight one point on which those usually called leeway theorists - i.e. those who accept the need for alternatives - agree, in contradistinction to those who deny that the ability to do otherwise is needed for free will. And I explain why it falsifies both of Franklinās claims
God is (probably) a cause among causes
Several recent authors have suggested that much of the discussion on divine action is flawed since it presupposes that divine and human agency compete. Such authors advocate a reappropriation of the Scholastic distinction between primary and secondary causation which, it is suggested, solves many problems in the theology of divine action. This article (i) critiques defences of the primary/secondary cause distinction based on appeals to analogical predication, and (ii) argues that, even assuming an adequate account of the primary/secondary cause distinction, the distinction provides no help in the development of non-interventionist accounts of special divine action